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SEEING IS BELIEVING-MOST OF THE TIME:
LAY OBSERVATION vs. PROVING THE OBVIOUS
Ralph C. Thomas*
For this Court to reverse the judgment . . . on a technicality
is to indulge in the kind of judicial antics which so exasperate
the tax-paying public and promotes public dissatisfaction with
the judicial system.1
Read out of context it is impossible to guess whether the above
statement stemmed from the writer's immersion in Bentham; 2 from fear
of proving Mr. Bumble's famous dictum that the "law is an ass",3 or
whether he is the prototype of Fuller's Judge Handy who intended
nothing more or less than his decision should mirror the public will.4
Study discloses that this was not an exasperated jeremiad, but
rather a realistic and honest reaction to recurring appellate frustration.
The quote is taken from Sumpter v. State,5 where the defendant had
been convicted of prostitution, despite the absence of evidence that she
was a female. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed 6 and the state
petitioned for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court. This court, al-
though recognizing the correctness of the reversal under "existing
law,"'7 constructed a new rule to be followed on remand in this case,
premised on the belief that recognition of a human's sex is attended
with a high degree of certainty. This certainty makes justifiable the
taking of judicial notice as to sex, the court ruled, and the construction
of a rebuttable presumption in accord. In cases where sex is an ele-
* Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A., University
of Tulsa; LL.B., University of Oklahoma; LL.M., New York University.
1. Sumpter v. State, 306 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Ind. 1974).
2. 7 J. BENTAM, THE WoRxs OF JEREMY BENTHAM 196 (Bowring ed. N.Y. 1838-
43).
3. C. DICKENS, OLIVER TwIST 644 (Lancer Books ed. 1948).
4. L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS Op JURIsPRuD'ENC E 22 (temp. ed. 1949).
5. 306 N.E.2d 95 (Ind. 1974).
6. 296 N.E.2d 131 (Ct. App. Ind. 1973).
7. 306 N.E.2d 95, 98 (Ind. 1974).
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ment to be proven, the defense may respond with countervailing evi-
dence, thus forcing the state to prove affirmatively the sex of the ac-
cused. In the absence of countervailing proof, the judicial notice will
supply a prima facie case.
This procedure, stemming from the belief that recognition of adult
human sexual characteristics is one of the talents possessed by other
adult humans, should indeed be satisfying to a layman. It seems fair
to say that it is an absurd judicial antic to negate an entire trial for the
failure on the part of the party having the burden of proof to assert
the obvious. Whether the failure stemmed from inadvertence or
naIvet6, the layman would view it correctly as a matter of gamesman-
ship for courts to participate in the useless expenditure of effort attend-
ant on another trial just to see to it that the game is played according
to the rules.
The doctrine expounded in this case is found in the pronounce-
ments of a number of cases to the effect that inasmuch as the formula-
tion of opinions about such matters open to observation as sex,8 age,
race, and the like is so common and so constantly indulged in by man-
kind in the pursuit of its manifold non-courtroom activities, it may be
allowed as lay opinion testimony and need not depend upon the pro-
duction of experts. Logically, it follows, as many cases hold, that if
a witness who demonstrates no more than ordinary discernment can,
from the stand, assert his opinion as to age, sex and other matters of
common experience, jurors possessed of no lesser capabilities can like-
wise form opinions and act upon them.
If the jury, using its powers of observation, formulates an opinion
and acts on it, this leads to several points of tension. These points are
of greater or lesser gravity depending upon the facts of the individual
case and its nature. Analysis leads to the realization that creation of
an all-embracing rule would not suffice. Whatever its configuration,
the result would be to sweep at least some of the problems under the
rug.
The difficulties besetting this area of fact finding are found in cases
which question the jury's perceptive powers despite the existence of
the centuries-old belief, hardened into a rule of evidence, that mankind
8. No attempt will be made in these pages to deal with the problems inherent
in sex cases dealing with transexuals, transvestites and other sex-centered anomalies.
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SEEING IS BELIEVING
has these abilities. Argument is made against the practice, because,
it is asserted, human perception and powers of delineation are not that
fine. A point of tension, and one of considerable gravity is jury usage
of these powers of perception in the criminal caseY
It is in the fields of race identification and age recognition that most
cases lie. Sumpter perhaps stands alone because of the manifest silli-
ness of the appellate complaint or because such ineptitude on the part
of the prosecution is rare. As these pages disclose, only in cases in-
volving age is the desperate plea for another chance in which to lose
so clearly seen.
RACE
The dangerously deceptive potential for error in racial recognition
is perhaps best shown by the language of a North Carolina court in
187610 and the guarded caution urged by its counterpart in South
Carolina thirty years before. The North Carolina trial court, proceed-
ing from the premise that the issue of a white couple must perforce
be white and that evidence of other racial strains is admissible on the
legitimacy of a child born during the continuance of the marriage, al-
lowed witnesses to describe the disputed heir and give opinions with
respect to whether she had mixed blood but refused to let the child be
exhibited to the jury for their scrutiny and determination. The su-
preme court, in reversing, said:
[I]t would seem that when the question is whether a certain
object is black or white, the best evidence of the color would
be the exhibition of the object to the jury. The eyes of mem-
bers of the jury must be presumed to be as good as those of
medical men. Why should a jury be confined to hearing what
other men think they have seen and not be allowed to see for
themselves?" 1"
The South Carolina court dealt with the argument that the relators
should escape the capitation tax imposed on free Negroes, mulattoes
and mestizoes who claimed to be white. In disposing of the issue, the
court said:
9. It is to be noted that reference is made to observations of jurors. The thrust
of this study is the ability of finders of fact to discern physiological characteristics
as a prelude to the finder's action. Jurors are singled out for clarity. Tribunals sitting
without juries are subject to the same infirmities and blessed with the same powers
of perception.
10. Warlick v. White, 76 N.C. 166 (1876).
11. Id. at 169.
1977],
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The disqualification arises from descent from one of the
African race; and the various degrees in which the physical
peculiarities are transmitted in descent, makes those peculiari-
ties a very uncertain criterion of caste. It may happen that
persons, in equal degree from the African stock, may present
such different complexions and features that they would
readily be assigned to different castes.1 2
An even earlier case justifying the lay delineation of race by ob-
servation was Gentry v. McMinnis,'3 which rises almost to the dignity
of a philosophical defense. The court stated:
To a rational man of perfect organization, the best and
highest proof of which any fact is susceptible, is the evidence
of his own senses. This is the ultimate test of truth, and is
therefore the first principle in the philosophy of evidence. He
who denies or doubts the evidence of his own proper senses,
will, of course, deny or doubt the existence of matter, and
be an universal sceptic; and to such a mind, there can be no
such thing as proof; for if he distrust his own senses, he will
be much more distrustful of the testimony of others, as to the
evidence of their senses. Hence autopsy, or the evidence
of one's own senses, furnishes the strongest probability, and
indeed the only perfect and indubitable certainty, of the
existence of any sensible fact. 4
It must be understood in Gentry, as in other cases discussed under
this heading, that status, rather than the appearance of status, is the
issue. Thus it was that, following the forceful and rational defense of
the practice of allowing the jury to rely on their sense of observation,
the court went on to say that appearance would only give a prima facie
showing of status which was capable of being destroyed by evidence
of a life which indicated slavery, sales, involuntary servitude, etc. The
importance of the quotation above is that it states with clarity the
foundation stone of the practice in this and other areas: there is little
purpose in calling witnesses to categorize from observable physical
characteristics a human condition. Feeling bound, perhaps, to ground
its decision on something other than pure logic, the Kentucky court
took authority for the practice from an 1811 Virginia case, which al-
lowed the jury to listen to witnesses describing the subject as a person
of color and then disregard the testimony and decide the case on their
own observation. In this case the court said:
12. White v. Tax Collector, 37 S.C.L. (3 Rich.) 136, 139 (Ct. Law 1846).
13. 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 382 (1835).
14. Id. at 386. A modem case to the same effect is White v. Holderby, 192 F.2d
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If the plaintiff Nanny had not been before the jury,
they must have found their verdict upon the testimony of
others, which would have amounted only to a probability. But
here they have the highest evidence, the evidence of their own
senses; and upon that they find a verdict: in other words,
the jury find a verdict upon their own knowledge.1 5
Perhaps the clearest exposition of the court's conception of the vis-
ible indicia of race, at least where blacks were concerned, is found in
Hudgins v. Wrights'0 where the court, after disclaiming an intimate
acquaintance with the natural history of the human species, said:
Nature has stampt upon the African and his descendants
two characteristic marks, besides the difference of complexion,
which often remain visible long after the characteristic dis-
tinction of colour either disappears or becomes doubtful; a
flat nose and woolly head of hair. The latter of these charac-
teristics disappears the last of all: and so strong an ingredient
in the African constitution is this latter character, that it pre-
dominates uniformly where the party is in equal degree des-
cended from parents of different complexions, whether white
or Indians; giving to the jet black lank hair of the Indian a
degree of flexure, which never fails to betray that the party
distinguished by it, cannot trace his lineage purely from the
race of native Americans.' 7
Even more lay expertise was claimed in a later Arkansas case,
Daniels v. Guy,"8 where a point of controversy in a lawsuit over the
freedom of plaintiffs was solved in part by the court allowing plaintiffs
to uncover and show their bare feet to the jury. The court, noting that
physicians had testified in the case that one of the indicia of Negro
blood or descent was the appearance of their feet, went on to observe
that those familiar with the physiology of the Negro would recognize
the truth of the testimony and then added, "No one, who is familiar
with the peculiar formation of the negro foot, can doubt, but that an
inspection of that member would ordinarily afford some indication of
the race . ... 1
The cases to this point have dealt with lay recognition of those
who bear characteristics of the black race.2 ° With the exception of oc-
15. Hook v. Pagee, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 500, 502 (1811).
16. 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 71 (1806).
17. Id. at 73.
18. 23 Ark. 50 (1861).
19. Id. at 52.
20. Scholarly clarity in the racial cases demands that terms and theories be faith-
fully recorded even though they may have vanished from the American scene. The
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casional dicta found in cases dealing with slavery, which purported to
describe the physical indicia of American Indians and persons of the
Caucasian race, most energy has been expended toward scrutiny of
cases of racial recognition; black vis-a-vis white. However, it may be
seen that no precise boundaries are laid out. Controversy has arisen
in cases of illegitimacy upon the propriety of allowing the jury to be
advised of the appearance of the putative father when in one case he
was said to be Spanish, 1 and in another when the subject was reputed
to be Italian.22 Neither case contains a good discussion but both appar-
ently proceed upon the belief that a person of either ancestry would
have a swarthy or olive complexion which would appear in the child
born of union with one not of that ancestry.
What perhaps may be discerned as the beginning of the swing of
the pendulum is to be found in Almeida v. Correa,23 where, in an issue
of paternity, the court said: "Contrary to widely accepted thinking, the
identification of 'racial characteristics' and their relevance to paternity
are not matters of common knowledge but subjects of expert testi-
mony. '24 Just how far this judicial disparagement of the age-old con-
cept of race identification may be carried is open to question. The
opinion in Almeida does not indicate the precise problem before the
court, but perhaps a hint of the genesis of such a wide sweeping pro-
nouncement is found in the court's recognition that the decision is
handed down in a state noted for its interracial mixtures. One cannot
resist speculation that the anthropological experts for which the court
signals a need may take the stand and describe the racial characteristics
that have surfaced in opinions discussed heretofore. Assuming for the
sake of discussion that certain races have genetic differences that find
their expression in identifiable bodily characteristics, few would argue
that experts are needed to supply information not within the lay do-
main. However, one suspects that an across the broad application of
this concept will result in the absurdity decried more than one hundred
years ago, the taking of the stand by a witness to describe that which
all can see.
21. Peters v. Campbell, 345 P.2d 234 (Wyo. 1959). See also State v. Saidell, 70
N.H. 174, 46 A. 1083 (1900), holding the jury could determine that the subject child
was Jewish by looking at him.
22. Morrison v. People ex rel. Richard, 52 Ill. App. 482 (1893).
23. 465 P.2d 564 (Hawaii 1970). But see United States v. Hung Chang, 134 F.
19, 23 (6th Cir. 1904). The trial court in this case had anticipated Almeida by forty-
six years. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the suspected alien looked like a
Chinaman (the court's wording) "to any person of common knowledge and informa-
tion."
24. 465 P.2d at 570 n.9.
[Vol. 12:487
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When attention is turned to age, some relief from the sordid cata-
log of man's degradation is found, if only by contrast. The bulk of
the cases deal with sexual misconduct involving the inroads on chastity
that the law has proscribed because of the youth of one of the par-
ticipants. Some involve non-sexual activity prohibited to preserve the
innocence of those beneath the permitted age. Lacking, for the most
part, moral issues, are cases involving minors' contracts.
In a case which, if handled differently, would properly draw the
appellation of judicial antics by Judge Hunter, the defendant in State
v. Thompson,2 5 charged with embezzlement, raised the defense that in
the absence of proof as to his age the state had failed in its prima facie
case, which required that he be shown to be over sixteen years of age.
He had testified he was a graduate of the University of Michigan law
department, was licensed to practice law in the courts of Illinois and
the federal courts in Chicago, was admitted to the bar in Texas, and
had represented various insurance companies in St. Louis for four or
five years. The court said this testimony, plus his appearance on the
stand, justified the jury in convicting him.26
Another resort to what the layman would condemn unhesitatingly
as a technicality is found in State v. Dorathy,27 which would be amusing
were it not laced with such pathos. Defendant, accused of taking in-
decent liberties with an eight year old girl, was alleged by the indict-
ment as being of the age of 74 years. No evidence was offered as
to his age, but the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, disposing of his argu-
ment that injustice was done by allowing the jury to decide an element
of his case unaided by testimony, said: "[Tihe inference is unavoid-
able that every alert and intelligent juror sworn then must have seen
respondent, whom probably to know aright as to age was but to see."28
Almost the same wording would have sufficed to dispose of defendant's
argument in Torres v. State,29 where his conviction for unlawful inter-
course with a fourteen year old girl was challenged on the basis that
no proof had been introduced that defendant was over sixteen years
of age. Although the source of the information is not clear, the su-
25. 155 Mo. 300, 55 S.W. 1013 (1909).
26. To the same effect is State v. Gebhardt, 219 Mo. 708, 119 S.W. 350 (1909),
where the defendant, who had been a candidate for city attorney, faced the same charge
and raised the same argument with the same result.
27. 132 Me. 291, 170 A. 506 (1934).
28. Id. at -, 170 A. at 508.
29. 521 P.2d 386 (Alas. 1974).
19771
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preme court knew in fact that Torres was forty-four years old and that
the prosecutrix had testified that he was twenty-eight.
Two cases dealing with the immigration of Orientals into the
United States disclose the sometimes inescapable usage of these per-
ceptive faculties by the trier of fact. In United States ex rel. Fong On
v. Day,30 an issue of parentage was tried. It was established that if
the alien youth seeking entrance into the United States in 1929 was
not an imposter he must perforce be about twelve years of age, because
it was known the man claiming fatherhood had not been in China since
1916. Testimony was offered that the applicant was twelve and one-
half years old. The immigration board before which he appeared
found him to be at least twenty years old and a public health surgeon
certified that he was at least sixteen years of age. Judge Swan, noting
the possibility of difficulty occasioned by having occidentals estimate
the age of orientals, nonetheless held that the defendant's mature ap-
pearance before the board and the certificate of the surgeon justified
the board's order of exclusion. In United States ex rel. Soo Hoo Hong
v. Tod,31 the relator sought to establish that he was twenty years of
age. He was excluded by the immigration board on its finding that
he was well over twenty-one years old. This case is marred somewhat
by the inclusion of testimony that he was twenty-four years old; al-
though recanted and not accorded controlling weight by the court, it
casts a shadow on the holding that the exclusion was based on the
board's finding from personal scrutiny that the relator was well over
twenty-one years of age.
It seems self-evident that if determination of age is within the lay
domain, some determinations are of more ease than others. In short,
inexpert and untrained eyes could tell, barring the occasional anoma-
lous case, whether the subject of their scrutiny was a boy of less than
thirteen or a youth of sixteen. It might be asserted that the difference
in appearnce is that which obtains between a child and a man. On
the other hand, in the case of Soo Hoo Hong, the difference perceived
is between that of a young man and that of a young man a little older.
Surely this is a more questionable discrimination.
Soo Hoo Hong serves to introduce the cases which comprise the
principal areas of tension in this sector of trial. Few would contest the
ability of ordinary human perception to distinguish between the vari-
30. 54 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1932).
31. 290 F. 689 (2d Cir. 1923).
[Vol. 12:487494
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ous stages in the growth of the human, classifying them as babyhood,
childhood, adolescence, youth and, within a larger framework, adult-
hood which lasts until old age or senescence. Within these groups, few
are perceptive enough, it is submitted, to define confidently their opin-
ion in years. Certainly it seems that most could accurately distinguish
between an infant and a kindergarten child; a kindergartner and one
ready to enter high school. Accuracy could expectably diminish when
distinction is asserted between one chronologically of the age to leave
high school and one chronologically in his mid-years of college. As
the measuring device is broadened, accuracy returns. Distinction with
certainty is again possible between one of the chronological age for
graduation from college and one who is ten or fifteen years older. Al-
most absolute certainty should be accorded to lay recognition as the dif-
ference between different age groups broadens. To accord youth to
one past sixty, or senility to one in his thirties, is to err badly or to be
honestly mistaken because the objective signs are misleading.
In the field of age, as in the field of race, there is room for the
insight of the Hawaii court in Almeida.82 Without any attempt in this
study to draw on authoritative sources, it nonetheless would seem that
physicians and others skilled in physiology should best be able to define
with precision the age of the subject of inquiry, buttressing their testi-
mony by reference to certain expectable and almost unvarying indicia,
such as the growth of teeth, hair, and attrition of the body, including
the acquisition of the normal earmarks of age. One advantage, if we
accord to the expert the critical faculty that should be his atrribute, is
that the expert would not be deceived by one indicator alone, grey hair
for example, but would look for other indicia of age, which, if present,
would tell him the extent of the aging process or, if absent, would
alert him to the presence of the false sign. Suspicion is ready that the
expert lacks such powers of discrimination and classification within the
subgroups suggested here. It may be argued that he could tell whether
the subject of his scrutiny is an adolescent or a youth, but still be unable
to define in terms of precise years the age of the youth. It is probable
that only on the infantile end of the human spectrum could one skilled
in physiology be expected to estimate with reasonable certainty one's
month of existence.
Assuming for discusion that even experts would experience the
above described difficulty, courts generally have not drawn back from
32. 465 P.2d 564 (Hawaii 1970).
1977]
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arrogating to themselves, or delegating to the jury, these precise
categorizations. Perhaps one of the most striking cases allowing such
jury activity is Schnoor v. Meinecke,"8 a personal injury action in which
defendant wished to confine plaintiff to his action under workmen's
compensation with its attendant protection to the employer of limited
damages. Plaintiff testified that he falsified his age at the time he
made application for work and, at sixteen, was too young to be covered
under the workmen's compensation act at the time of his injury. He
was corroborated by his parents and by a certified copy of his birth
certificate. The jury, responding to an interrogatory, found that he was
seventeen, the age he had claimed to be at the time of employment
and thus found in favor of defendant.
Although it may be suspected that there was more of rough justice
in the jury answer to the interrogatory than there was of innate skill
in determining age, it is noteworthy that the North Dakota court took
the stand that the credibility of witnesses was an issue for the jury.
Noting his statements to his employer that he was seventeen at the time
of hiring and when first making a workmen's compensation claim, the
court said, "These statements together with plaintiffs physical appear-
ance constitute the evidence upon which the jury made its finding that
he was seventeen years of age at the time of the accident. .... -84
As may be seen in the discussion that follows, jury resolution of the
question of age often is allowed where there is a dearth of testimony with
respect to age. In Schnoor it is well not to be distracted by the fact that
the plaintiff's testimony and that of his parents were from interested par-
ties and that a birth certificate in North Dakota is only prima facie evi-
dence of its contents. Nor is it important that plaintiff's prior inconsistent
statements were lies. The important factor is that the jury was allowed
to take the position that they could tell whether a teenager was sixteen
or seventeen by looking at him. Surely if the theory of the Hawaii
court in Almeida is to invade the field of age estimation, this is fertile
ground for scrutiny.
Schnoor may give rise to justifiable suspicion that the jury allowed
plaintiff to suffer the disabilities attendant upon an age adopted by him
in order to avoid otherwise expectable disadvantages. In the time-
honored phrase, they may well have expressed by their verdict that hay-
33. 40 N.W.2d 803 (N.D. 1950).
34. Id. at 807 (emphasis added). The court relied on JONES ON EvIENcn and
WIGMORE in allowing physical appearance to be utilized to resolve conflicting testimony.
[Vol. 12:487
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ing made his bed he could lie in it. However, cases abound where
the jury's perception, deduced from their verdict, gives no hint of pun-
ishing the person whose age is in question but, indeed, hints at just
the opposite.
Clarity demands division of the following cases into two principal
categories; either the litigated activity is not of criminal character if
both parties are consenting and below a certain statutory age, or the
punishment may vary depending upon the age of one or both of the
parties. In either instance, many cases turn on the jury's usually in-
articulated opinion that the subject is of a certain age. The opinion
is expressed in their verdict which, in the absence of the formation of
such an opinion would have been one of no guilt. These cases are
striking because few make the distinction that the youthful subject is
either one year older or younger than the statutory line of demarcation.
A question arises as to the reason for these verdicts. Do they
stem from agreement with the accolade of perception bestowed on the
jury in the instructions? Do jurors believe they have these perceptive
faculties without being told? Have they disregarded the stern admoni-
tion that the charge is not evidence and therefore failed to demand
proof that the allegation of age be proven? Or have they realized that
this fact remains unproven, at least in the formal sense, but assumed
that the charge would never have been brought if the state had lacked
the proof? Lastly, have they accomplished with lay simplicity that
which the Indiana court wrought with legal erudition in Sumpter?85
Have they ruled that if the party who stands to lose because of an ad-
verse finding as to age can refute the charge, and thus avert the loss,
he will do so? Stripped of its judicial cloak, that is exactly what Judge
Hunter did.30 The significance of a jury utilizing the same basic mental
processes as that of an appellate judge is that, unlike him, they may
not know what they do.
It is to be suspected that a high percentage of the laity see nothing
wrong in creating in the defendant the hazard of not speaking when
circumstances demonstrate that to speak would acquit him. If, indeed,
the defendant has the means to disprove the charge it is unnatural, in
lay eyes, for him to remain mute. This idea is not one alien to the
law; most of the thrust of the law of presumptions is to cast upon one
side or the other the duty to speak.8 T A presumption may make the
35. See notes 1-7 supra and accompanying text.
36. 306 N.E.2d at 103.
37. C. McCoumcm, EvIDENCE § 342, at 803 (2d ed. 1972).
1977]
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party speak because it is obvious that he is the only one possessed of
the requisite knowledge.3" Nor is this concept confined to the civil
field. Many a criminal defendant has found himself offering evidence
about alibi, insanity, self-defense and the like simply because the state
does not have a duty to initiate proof on these matters.89 Courts hasten
to add, in most instances, that the defendant need prove nothing and
that the burden of proof does not shift, but the cold fact is that if the
jury is to hear his side he must provide the testimony, or suffer the
chance of conviction.
Strange conceits surface where opinion based on visual contact is
given sway, but seldom are they as strange as in Kieth v. New Haven
& N. R.40 The issue presented by the case was whether the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries was the failure of defendant railroad em-
ployee to inspect properly and thus detect defects in cars from other
roads hooked onto New Haven trains. No evidence was offered as to
the inspector's competence. The trial court refused defendant's re-
quest to take from the jury the issue of the inspector's qualifications
and intelligence. On appeal, the court said:
The jury was permitted to consider the appearance and con-
duct of the inspector who was called as a witness, to aid them
in determining whether he was a person of suitable qualifica-
tions and of sufficient intelligence to be entrusted with so
responsible a duty. It is impossible for us to say that . . .
his appearance and conduct in the presence of the jury might
not be legally sufficient to satisfy them that he was an in-
competent person.
* * . It may well have been that the jury did acquire
a knowledge of material facts as to the intelligence of the
inspector by his examination as a witness. 4'
Perhaps more dangerous because of the gravity of the decision
was Jones v. State,42 a rape case where the court instructed the jury
that consent was possible between the ages of ten and fourteen if the
female's mental and physical development was such as to render con-
sent possible. Defendant was convicted and argued on appeal that the
girl was within the defined years and capable of consent. The Georgia
court said:
The girl was the main witness for the state, and as such was
38. Id. § 343.
39. Id. § 341.
40. 140 Mass. 176, 3 N.E. 28 (1885).
41. Id. at--, 3 N.E. at 29.
42. 106 Ga. 365, 34 S.E. 174 (1899).
[Vol. 12:487
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examined and cross-examined in the presence of the jury. Thejury had the right, in forming an opinion with reference to her
capacity or want of capacity to consent to sexual intercourse,
to take into consideration facts discovered, by their own obser-
vations of the girl herself, her apparent physical develop-
ment, her manner of testifying, and the degree of intelligence
manifested by her while being examined as a witness.4
3
A case with considerably less damaging potential is Orscheln v.
Scott,44 a personal injury case where an absence of evidence fixing the
age of plaintiff rendered the award of future damages less than certain.
The appellate court, in what is submitted is a model of judicial reason,
found no error in submitting the case for the jury's consideration of this
part of the award:
In cases of this character, it is of no practical importance to
know the precise age . . . . It would make no appreciable
or substantial difference in the jury's estimate of probable
future damages, whether the injured party was ten, or twelve
years of age; or, whether he was forty or forty-one, two, three
or four years old. . . It seems to me, therefore, that the
observation of plaintiff by the jury was sufficient as a basis
from which to estimate the damages.
Although the court relied on cases involving statutory rape and the like,
it would seem that there is manifest good sense in its decision. Re-
flection discloses that there is a high element of prophecy in the per-
sonal injury damage award for future damages. 4' As prophecies are
subject to the infirmities of man's judgment, the court does no more
than to admit that error on the near end of the projection, for lack of
precise information, is not likely to harm more than error on its far
reach. It is clear that what is offered is at best an informed prognosis
and at worst a wild guess. It is true that in this day of major damage
verdicts an error of several years may be measured in the tens of thou-
sands of dollars; however honesty compels the admission that this risk
obtains if the prognosis premised on the informed (by hypothesis)
prophecy does not prove out. In a similar case, the court, instructing
the jury on the same issue, said that plaintiff was fifty-seven years of
age. On motion for new trial, the court said with reference to the in-
struction:
I gave it, of course, with the conception that there was testi-
43. Id. at -, 34 S.E. at 175.
44. 90 Mo. App. 352 (Ct. App. 1901).
45. Id. at 361, 362.
46. See Thomas, Medical Prophecy and the Single Award: The Problem and a
Proposal, 1 TuLSA LJ. 135 (1964).
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mony in this record as to plaintiff's age and Mr. Bassett seems
still to think there is. I don't know positively, but plaintiff
was here before this jury. It was evident to every one of
47us that he was a man well in middle age ....
Another defensible case is First National Bank v. Casey.48 Here
the statute dealing with infancy deprived the infant of his power of dis-
affirmance where through the minor's own misrepresentations as to his
majority, or from his having engaged in business as an adult, the other
party had good reason to believe him capable of contracting. The mer-
chants he dealt with took his appearance as evidence of maturity. The
court noted that the jury could see the minor defendant and could con-
sider whether plaintiff was justified in failing to question the defend-
ant's adulthood. The appearance of the minor was a proper matter
for the jury to consider in determining the truth of the assertion that
the other party to the contract had good reason to believe him an adult.
One of the major stumbing blocks to usage of this evidence is the
procedural inhibition, real or imagined, raised when reliance on it is
sought. Perhaps the most basic obstacle and the one most deserving
of attention is that which stems from the universally acknowledged duty
of the state to prove every element of the offense in the criminal pro-
secution. Indeed, in Sumpter v. State,4 9 the case which provided the
keynote for these pages, one judge registered an indignant dissent re-
affirming the duty of the state and characterized the majority opinion
as an abrogation of this time-honored protection." As is often true,
general rules do not comfortably govern particular cases and, the dis-
sent notwithstanding, it would be a judicial farce (assuming no physio-
logical anomaly) to send the case back to establish that which the de-
fendant would be powerless to conceal, her femininity.
It is in the field of subtle discriminations, such as whether the sub-
ject is seventeen or eighteen, twenty or twenty-one, that perhaps more
attention to compelling proper presentation of the case should be re-
quired. Cases may arise where the age of the subject is not known.
In such a case, the passage or lack of one day may well mean guilt
or innocence in the criminal case and liability or non-liability in the civil
case. Sexual intercourse with a girl on the eve of her statutory maturity
is criminal. The same act a day later is perhaps no less reprehensible
in the field of morals, but is outside the ambit of the criminal law.
47. Shepherd v. Smith, 198 Wash. 395, -, 88 P.2d 601, 604 (1939).
48. 158 Iowa 349, 138 N.W. 897 (1912).
49. 306 N.E.2d 95 (Ind. 1974).
50. Id. at 104 (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
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Such cases, although few depend on such narrow margins, test our sys-
tem of justice. If the state does not furnish proof of non-age in these
close cases and courts wink at this demonstrated inability or ineptitude,
our articulated rules of procedure are abandoned for no justifiable
societal gain.
With perhaps discernible pride, it may be pointed out that, for the
most part, our reports of decisions contain few examples of such knife-
edge decisions in the criminal field.51 Most cases where jury judgment
prevails over testimony, or the lack of it, deal with much wider margins
than are suggested. 52  It is to different issues that appellate objection
is raised in cases of non-enunciated proof. Many objections deal with
the inability of the reviewing court to evaluate the correctness of the
jury's determination.5 3  A few perceptive courts have pointed out that
objections of this nature ignore the familiar appellate dilemma of re-
view in cases containing views by the jury.54 An even more common
instance is that of jury evaluation of a plaintiff's complaints by observing
his physical condition and the tiresomely common appellate refusal to
denigrate the testimony of one or more witnesses because the triers of
fact had the unique opportunity to observe and form an opinion as to
their probity. Lastly, and fittingly so, are those few opinions that would
credit the jury with capricious opinions as their prerogative.55
51. One such case is State v. Robinson, 32 Ore. 43, 43 P. 357 (1897), where the
court excluded opinion testimony by the defense concerning the defendant's age, saying
that the jury could determine whether she was older than her asserted age of fifteen
merely by observing her. See also People v. Meade, 10 N.Y.S. 953 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
1890), allowing jurors to inspect and determine the age of children suspected of being
under sixteen, the statutory minimum age for employment; Stiles v. State, 39 Okla.
Crim. 173, 264 P. 226 (1928), allowing jury appraisal of a girl to determine whether
she was fifteen or eighteen years of age.
52. See Hermann v. State, 73 Wisc. 248, 41 N.W. 171 (1888), where a jury was
allowed to determine that a sixteen year old girl was not twenty-one years of age by
observing her physical appearance.
53. See Wistrand v. People, 213 Ill. 72, -, 72 N.E. 748, 751 (1904); People v.
Kielczewski, 269 111. 293, -, 109 N.E. 981, 983 (1915). Both cases involved a deter-
mination of the defendant's age by the trial court, although the choices offered differed
by only one or two years. The trial courts were reversed and the cases remanded
for this reason. See also First National Bank v. Casey, 158 Iowa 349, -, 138 N.W.
897, 899 (1912). Cf. Watson v. State, 140 N.E.2d 109 (Ind. 1957) (where defendant
did not take the stand to testify as to his age, it was erroneous for the jury to estimate
his age, even though he had been properly identified in their presence).
54. See Orscheln v. Scott, 90 Mo. App. 352, 365 (Ct. App. 1901).
55. See State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951). Although not
a recognition case, Lawrence expresses this view with stark clarity. Reversing the trial
court for having taken judicial notice that a two year old Ford in good condition was
worth more than the $50.00 minimum required for grand larceny, the appellate court
said, "However, under our jury system, it is traditional that in criminal cases juries
can, and sometimes do, make findings which are not based on logic, nor even common
sense." Id. at -, 234 P.2d 603.
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What then is the correct solution? It would seem that correctness
lies in treating as immaterial error the failure to assert and prove that
which it would be futile to deny: that an obvious toddler is incapable
of giving consent; that a person of middle years is not an adolescent;
that one possessing certain recognizable sexual characteristics is not of
a different sex. Whether clothed in procedural formalities or viewed
as a fact of life, as most courts have done, the essential commonsense
bursts through. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the public
will does not override the collective wisdom of the ages when man tries
man for liberty, life or property. It should be seen as a misreading
of these duty orders when justice is delayed, made more expensive or
thwarted by the order of a court that sees its duty in the simplistic com-
mand to so control the administration of justice that the rules are ob-
served no matter how absurd the consequences.
It is not wrong to insist on intelligent adherence to the rules. Jus-
tice is produced, in our concept, when the court insists on the prosecu-
tion carrying its burden in the case of the hairline decision where the
passage of a day, a month or a year may well mean conviction and ruin
or exoneration and honor for the person whose fate depends on that
determination. It is not subversive of human liberty or property rights
to put forward the view that it is only the finely drawn determinations
that should be accorded the procedural niceties fashioned as safe-
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